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Minimizing the Putative Father's Rights: In re Adoption
of Clark
The question of what rights, if any, to accord a putative father' concerning
his nonmarital child is one that has plagued many courts. 2 The problem facing
these courts is resolution of the apparent conflict between the interests of the
father and those of the child. Courts must balance the father's interest in cus-
tody of his child against the child's interest in completing the adoption process
as quickly as possible. 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently ex-
amined these competing interests in In re Adoption of Clark.4
Specifically, the court addressed the issue of a putative father's rights to his
child once an adoption petition has been filed.5 The court held that if the puta-
tive father fails to take any steps to legitimate his child before the filing of the
adoption petition, he has no rights6 and his consent to the adoption is unneces-
sary. 7 The court reached this decision even though the father was not at fault
for failing to initiate legitimation proceedings. 8
This Note traces United States Supreme Court decisions which address the
issue of an unwed father's rights. It then looks at North Carolina law regarding
adoption and termination of parental rights. It goes on to address some of the
1. A "putative father" is "[tihe alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 578-80, 385 N.W.2d 448, 452
(1986) (statute authorizing an unwed mother to give legally effective unilateral consent to adoption if
unwed father fails to file notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days after child's birth does not
deny due process or equal protection); In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 25-26, 730 P.2d 942, 945
(1986) (when unwed father has failed to develop a substantial relationship with child and has not
been denied the opportunity by the state, the state is not required to obtain father's consent to child's
adoption); Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984) ("state's strong
interest in immediate and secure adoptions for eligible newborns provides a sufficient justification for
significant variations in the parental rights of unwed fathers who, in contrast to mothers, are not
automatically identified by virtue of their role in the process of birth.").
3. See In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho at 25-26, 730 P.2d at 945 ('because of a child's urgent need
for permanence and stability, the unwed father must act quickly to take responsibilities and establish
ties"); Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (interests of unwed
father and his child conflict); Interest of Ice, 35 III. App.3d 783, 785-86, 342 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1976)
(best interests of child balanced against tight of natural parent to the custody of his child).
4. 95 N.C. App. 1, 381 S.E.2d 835 (1989).
5. Id. at 4, 381 S.E.2d at 837.
6. North Carolina courts historically have accorded the putative father only minimal rights.
See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 714-15, 142 S.E.2d 592, 595-96 (1965) (mother has paramount
right to custody of her illegitimate child, putative father not entitled to custody without showing the
mother is unfit); In re Doe, 11 N.C. App. 560, 562-63, 181 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1971) (validity of
consent of unwed mother to adoption of child was not affected by putative father's subsequent legiti-
mation proceeding wherein child was declared legitimate; thus putative father's consent would not
be necessary in any pre-legitimation adoption proceeding).
7. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 9-10, 381 S.E.2d at 840 ("Since the record clearly
shows Mr. Lampe failed to take any steps before the filing of the adoption petition to legitimate this
child, we hold Mr. Lampe's consent to this adoption is unnecessary pursuant to Section 48-6(a)(3).")
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a)(3) (1984)).
8. Id. at 8, 381 S.E.2d at 839. ("[A] putative father's knowledge of the existence of his illegiti-
mate child is not relevant to a proper analysis of the necessity of a putative father's consent under
section 48-6(a)(3).").
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problems that are created by the court of appeals' decision in In re Adoption of
Clark. It concludes that the decision greatly diminishes the putative father's
rights and that other ways of protecting the interests of the child are needed in
order to avoid minimizing the father's rights.
Stephanie Clark gave birth to a child in August 1983 without telling the
child's natural father, Christian Lampe.9 Clark then relinquished all of her
rights to the child to an adoption agency, Family Services.10 After making some
attempts to locate Lampe, which amounted to calling one of the two lisitings
under the name "Lampe" in the Winston-Salem telephone directory, 11 Family
Services petitioned the court to terminate Lampe's parental rights based on his
failure to take steps to legitimate the child.12 Family Services served notice of
the termination hearing by publication 13 and the trial court entered an order
terminating Lampe's parental rights. 14 The adoptive parents then filed a peti-
tion to adopt the child and the clerk of court entered an interlocutory adoption
decree. 15
Family Services later wrote Lampe requesting information about his back-
ground in order to assist the child.1 6 The letter was the first knowledge Lampe
had of the child's existence. 1 7 Lampe then moved to set aside the termination
order on the ground that the service by publication was invalid because Family
Services failed to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate him.' 8 The dis-
trict court set aside the termination order and the court of appeals affirmed.19
Family Services and the adoptive parents continued to pursue adoption pro-
ceedings. 20 At a hearing to determine whether Lampe's consent was necessary
to the proposed adoption, the clerk of court concluded that such consent was
not necessary because Lampe failed to take any steps to legitimate or support the
child before the adoptive parents filed the petition.2 1 The superior court re-
versed the clerk, concluding that Lampe's consent was necessary before the
adoption could continue, and dismissed the adoption petition. 22 Family Services
and the adoptive parents appealed.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding
that because Lampe failed to take any steps before the filing of the adoption
petition to legitimate the child, his consent to the adoption was unnecessary. 23
9. Id. at 3, 381 S.E.2d at 836.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 12, 381 S.E.2d at 842 (Cozort, J., dissenting).







19. Id. at 3-4, 381 S.E.2d at 836.
20. Id. at 4, 381 S.E.2d at 837.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 9, 381 S.E.2d at 840. The court also addressed two other issues: (1) whether the trial
court erroneously dismissed the adoption proceeding based on the petitioners' failure to join the
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The court reasoned that the nonmarital child's future welfare should not depend
on whether the putative father knows of the child's existence at the time the
adoption petition is filed.24 The court noted that the General Assembly had
weighed the putative father's rights against the child's need for a stable home
and selected the date the adoption petition is filed as the date before which the
father must take some step to legitimate or support the child.25 The court con-
cluded that placing the responsibility of discovering the birth of nonmarital chil-
dren on putative fathers is not unreasonable. 26
Judge Cozort dissented. He argued that the majority's "holding ignores the
fact that the father could not have attempted to legitimate the child because he
had no knowledge of the child; and he had no knowledge due to the petitioners'
lack of diligence .... "27 Judge Cozort went on to argue that the court should
not be a "party to such flaunting of the father's rights and the rules of law."'2 8
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of an unwed fa-
ther's rights in several cases. The Court initially afforded an unwed father's
parental rights some consitutional protection in Stanley v. Illinois.29 Stanley in-
volved an Illinois statute which, upon the death of the mother, declared children
of unwed fathers wards of the state without first requiring a hearing to deter-
mine parental fitness or any proof of neglect.30 Married fathers and unwed
mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, how-
ever.3 1 The Court concluded that
[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing
on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and
that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents
whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 2
Stanley thus established that an unwed father's right to custody of his
nonmarital child merits at least some constitutional protection. 33
putative father at the time the original adoption petition was filed, and (2) whether it erroneously
dismissed the proceedings based on the petitioners' initial failure to file an affidavit under North
Carolina General Statute Section 48-13 that the putative father's consent was not necessary under
Section 48-6(a)(3). Id. at 4, 381 S.E.2d at 837. The court held that the trial court could not dismiss
the adoption proceedings based on the petitioners' failure to name the putative father as a party
without first giving the petitioners the opportunity to join the father within a reasonable time. Id. at
6, 381 S.E.2d at 838. It also held that the trial court erroneously dismissed the adoption petition for
failure to comply with Section 48-13 at the time of the original filing, because the petitioners' affida-
vit relates back to the date the original petition was fied. Id. at 11, 381 S.E.2d at 841.
24. Id. at 8, 381 S.E.2d at 839.
25. Id. at 9, 381 S.E.2d at 840.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 13, 381 S.E.2d at 842 (Cozort, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (Cozort, J., dissenting).
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
30. Id. at 646-47.
31. Id. at 646.
32. Id. at 649. See also Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1974) (Oregon
statute permitting adoption of child born out of wedlock upon consent of natural mother, without
notice to, or consent of, natural father constitutionally null and void and unenforceable).
33. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 ("at the least, Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children
1990] FAMILY L.W 1259
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The Court addressed the scope of this new constitutional right to a hearing
on parental fitness in Quilloin v. Walcott.34 Quilloin involved a putative father's
attempts to prevent the adoption of his child by the husband of the child's
mother.35 The Court concluded that a Georgia statute requiring only the
mother's consent for the adoption of an illegitimate child and allowing the father
veto authority over the adoption only if he had legitimated the child 36 did not
violate the putative father's rights under the due process37 and equal protection
clauses.38 The Court based its decision on the father's failure to shoulder any
significant responsibility for the child's upbringing.39 Quilloin thus placed two
limitations on the parental rights of unwed fathers:
(1) a putative father's failure to show a substantial interest in his
child's welfare and to employ' methods provided by state law for solidi-
fying his parental rights... will remove from him the full constitu-
tional protection afforded the parental rights of other classes of
parents; and (2) the parental rights of a demonstrably disinterested pu-
tative father may be subordinated when in conflict with the interests of
an existing, recognized family unit of which his child is a member.4°
In Caban v. Mohammed4 l the Court again evaluated an unwed father's
rights in light of the degree of responsibility he had shown toward his children.
Caban involved the adoption of children by their natural mother's husband
without the natural father's consent.42 The New York statute in question gave
an unwed mother the authority to block the adoption of her child simply by
withholding consent, but did not give the unwed father similar control.43 The
father could prevent the termination of his parental rights only by showing that
the best interests of the child would not permit the child's adoption by the peti-
tioning couple.44 The Court held that this sex-based distinction between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers violated the equal protection clause because it bore
no substantial relation to any important state interest. 45 The Court qualified its
is cognizable and substantial"). See Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's
Existence, 76 Ky. LJ. 949, 950 (1988); Note, Notice of Relinquishment: The Key to Protecting the
Rights of Unwed Fathers and Adoptive Parents, 67 NEB. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1988) (hereinafter
Note, Notice of Relinquishment); Comment, Removing the Bar Sinister Adoption Rights of Putative
Fathers, 15 CuMB. L. REv. 499, 503 (1985).
34. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
35. Id. at 247.
36. Id. at 255-56.
37. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. ("No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... ).
38. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. ("No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws .... ").
39. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 ("[Ie has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child,
and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child.").
40. Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights" A Focus on "Family". 58 NEB. L. Rav. 610,
617 (1979).
41. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
42. Id. at 382-84.
43. Id. at 386-87.
44. Id. at 387.
45. Id. at 388-94.
1260 [Vol. 68
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holding, however, by emphasizing that the father had established a substantial
relationship with the children and had admitted his paternity.46 Caban and
Quilloin thus established that an unwed father has no absolute parental rights in
the absence of significant parental interest.4 7
In Lehr v. Robertson48 the Court found the right to notice of adoption pro-
ceedings depends on the degree of responsibility the putative father has accepted
for his child's care. The putative father in Lehr filed a petition to vacate an
adoption order because of lack of notice of the adoption proceedings. 49 The
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition, holding that because the puta-
tive father had never established a significant relationship with his child, failure
to give him notice of pending adoption proceedings did not deny him due pro-
cess or equal protection.5 0 The Court reached this conclusion despite the state's
actual knowledge of the putative father's existence and location.5 1 The Court
pointed out that the putative father could have guaranteed notice of any adop-
tion proceedings by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry.52 Accord-
ing to the Court, the Constitution extends greater protection to unwed fathers
who have the "biological link" to the child and who have developed a substan-
tial relationship with the child than to unwed fathers who have only the "biolog-
ical link."53
North Carolina's adoption laws define the rights of unwed fathers and their
children. At the opening of the chapter on adoptions, the General Assembly
states that its primary purpose is to protect children;54 its secondary purpose is
to protect biological and adoptive parents; and that when the interests of a child
and parent conflict, the interests of the child prevail.5 5 The General Assembly
46. Id. at 392-93.
47. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393-94 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256
(1978). See also In re Application of S.R.S. and M.B.S., 225 Neb. 759, 768-69, 408 N.W.2d 272,
278-79 (1987) (adoption could not proceed without putative father's consent where child was no
longer a newborn and had established strong ties with father who had acknowledged and supported
him).
48. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
49. Id. at 250.
50. Id. at 264-68.
5 1. Id. at 264-68. One commentator criticized the result in Lehr because it deprived "an unwed
father of notice and an opportunity to be heard, and ultimately of any legal connection with his
daughter, despite the fact that the presiding judge, the mother, and the potential adoptive father
knew where and how to locate the natural father, and were aware of his intent and incipient attempts
to claim paternity." Comment, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much Pro-
cess Is Due?, 7 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 265, 266 (1984).
52. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
53. Id. at 262.
54. See Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 708, 281 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1981)
("in any case involving the adoption of a child, the court's paramount concern is the child's wel-
fare"); In re Daughtridge, 25 N.C. App. 141, 148-49, 212 S.E.2d 519, 523-24 (1975) (employed "best
interests of the child" standard).
55. The North Carolina General Statutes provide:
The General Assembly hereby declares as a matter of legislative policy with respect to
adoption that-
(1) The primary purpose of the Chapter is to protect children from unnecessary sep-
aration from parents who might give them good homes and loving care, to protect them
from adoption by persons unfit to have the responsibility of their care and rearing, and to
protect them from interference, long after they have become properly adjusted in their
1990]
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balanced the interests of the child against the interests of its biological parents
and determined that the interests of the child are paramount.5 6
As part of this balancing process, the General Assembly determined that in
certain situations the interests of the child are so paramount that the consent of
the parents to the child's adoption is not required. Specifically, the statute states
that the putative father's consent is unnecessary unless prior to the filing of the
adoption petition: (1) paternity has been judicially established; (2) the child has
been legitimated; or (3) the father has provided substantial support or consistent
care to the child and mother.5 7 The statute expressly requires the consent of the
parents absent one of the exceptions. 58 Further, a final order of adoption effec-
tively divests the biological parents of all rights with respect to the child.5 9 The
court of appeals in Rhodes v. Henderson 60 reached the same result, holding that:
"[a] final decree of adoption for life terminates the relationship between the nat-
ural parents and the child, and the natural parents are divested of all rights with
respect to the child. ' '61
Under the North Carolina General Statutes, termination of parental rights
adoptive homes by biological parents who may have some legal claim becuase of a defect in
the adoption procedure.
(2) The second purpose of this Chapter is to protect the biological parents from
hurried decisions, made under strain and anxiety, to give up a child, and to protect adop-
tive parents from assuming responsibility for a child about whose heredity or mental or
physical condition they know nothing, and to prevent later disturbance of their relation-
ship to the child by biological parents whose legal rights have not been fully protected.
(3) When the interest of a child and those of an adult are in conflict, such conflict
should be resolved in favor of the child; and to that end this Chapter should be liberally
construed.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1 (1984).
56. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 8-9, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839-40 (1989).
57. The North Carolina General Statutes provide:
(a) The court shall determine whether the parent or parents of a child must give
written consent to adoption of said child in accordance with the following provisions:
(3) In the case of a child born out of wedlock the consent of the putative father shall
not be required unless prior to the filing of the adoption petition:
a. Paternity has been judicially established or acknowledged by affidavit which
has been filed in a central registry maintained by the Department of Human Re-
sources; provided, the court shall inquire of the Department of Human Resources
as to whether such an affidavit has been so filed and shall incorporate into the
case record the Department's certified reply; or
b. The child has been legitimated either by marriage to the mother or in accord-
ance with provisions of G.S. 49-10, a petition for legitimation has been filed; or
c. The putative father has provided substantial financial support or consistent
care with respect to the child and mother.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a)(3) (1984).
58. Id. at § 48-7(a).
59. Section 48-23 provides:
The following legal effects shall result from the entry of every final order of adoption:
(2) The biological parents of the person adopted, if living, shall, from and after the entry
of the final order of adoption, be relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them
to the person adopted, and shall be divested of all rights with respect to such person. This
section shall not affect the duties, obligations, and rights of a putative father who has
adopted his own child.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1984).
60. 14 N.C. App. 404, 188 S.E.2d 565 (1972).
61. Id. at 407, 188 S.E.2d at 567.
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is directly correlated to the state's adoption laws. The grounds for terminating a
putative father's parental rights are identical to the grounds which render his
consent to an adoption unnecessary. Specifically, a putative father's parental
rights may be terminated if, prior to the filing of a petition to terminate his
parental rights, he has not either: established paternity, legitimated the child, or
provided substantial support or consistent care to the child and mother.62
Before a court enters a termination order, however, the putative father must
have notice.63 The court of appeals addressed the notice issue in In re Clark,64
an earlier case involving the same parties as In re Adoption of Clark. The earlier
litigation involved Mr. Lampe's challenge to an order terminating his parental
rights.65 The court of appeals upheld his challenge, holding that "due diligence
is required in all parental rights termination cases before notice by publication
can properly be used, and that [Family Services] failed to meet this require-
ment."6 6 The court pointed to Family Services' reliance on information sup-
plied solely by the mother and its failure to check public records which would
have revealed Lampe's address.67 In re Clark thus requires the exercise of due
diligence in attempting to serve notice of a proceeding to terminate the putative
father's parental rights.6s
The court in its later decision in In re Adoption of Clark stated, however,
that termination of a putative father's rights prior to an adoption is not required
since the grounds which render a putative father's consent to the adoption un-
necessary are identical to the grounds for terminating his parental rights.69 The
court went on to hold that a putative father's consent to an adoption is unneces-
sary if he fails to take any steps to legitimate his child before the adoption peti-
62. Section 7A-289.32 provides in part:
The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more of the following:
(6) The father of a child born out of wedlock has not prior to the filing of a petition
to terminate his parental rights:
a. Established paternity judicially or by affidavit which has been filed in a cen-
tral registry maintained by the Department of Human Resources; provided, the
court shall inquire of the Department of Human Resources as to whether such an
affidavit has been so fied and shall incorporate into the case record the Depart-
ment's certified reply; or
b. Legitimated the child pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, or filed a petition
for this specific purpose; or
c. Legitimated the child by marriage to the mother of the child; or
d. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the
child and mother.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(6) (1989).
63. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.").
64. 76 N.C. App. 83, 332 S.E.2d 196, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C. 665, 335 S.E.2d 322 (1985).
65. Id. at 84, 332 S.E.2d at 197.
66. Id. at 84-85, 332 S.E.2d at 198.
67. Id. at 87, 332 S.E.2d at 199.
68. Id. at 87-88, 332 S.E.2d at 199-200.
69. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 7, 381 S.E.2d at 838-39 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48-6(a)(3) (1984) and § 7A-289.32(6) (1989)).
1990] FA MIL Y LAW 1263
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tion is filed.70 The court relied on North Carolina General Statutes section 48-6
which states that a putative father's consent to an adoption is not required unless
he has taken steps to legitimate the child prior to the filing of the adoption peti-
tion.7 1 According to the court, a putative father's knowledge of his child's exist-
ence is irrelevant to an analysis of the necessity of his consent under Section 48-
6.72 The statute provides that the putative father's consent is unnecessary unless
he takes steps to legitimate or support the child prior to the filing of the adoption
petition; it makes no mention of the father's knowledge of the child's existence. 73
The court thus argued that the statute does not make the illegitimate child's
future welfare dependent on "whether or not the putative father knows of the
child's existence at the time the petition is filed." 74 The dissent argued that the
father's failure to legitimate the child was due to the willful and negligent ac-
tions of the adoption agency and that the father should not suffer for those
actions. 75
In re Adoption of Clark appears to be in accord with North Carolina statu-
tory law. The decision furthers the primary legislative intent of making the
child's interests paramount.76 The adoption statutes operate smoothly in the
usual situations when either the identity of the father is unknown or the father
knows of the child and shows no interest in him. In these situations there should
be provisions for making the father's consent to adoption unnecessary or the
termination of his parental rights possible. The child's welfare should not de-
pend upon a father whose identity might never be known or upon a father who
does not care about him.
A problem arises in the application of these statutes, however, in a situation
such as the one in In re Adoption of Clark. In that case the father's identity was
known, but he never had the opportunity to take responsbility for his child
before his parental rights were terminated. The court of appeals failed to con-
sider this lack of opportunity when it decided In re Adoption of Clark.
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed directly the issue of
whether this opportunity is required. 77 Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr all
involved situations in which the father had an opportunity to establish some
kind of relationship with his child. The father in In re Adoption of Clark, in
contrast, never had an opportunity to establish the significant relationship that
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr require. It is therefore difficult to make any pro-
nouncements about whether Clark is in accord with these precedents.
70. Id. at 9, 381 S.E.2d at 840.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a)(3) (1984).
72. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 8, 381 S.E.2d at 839.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a)(3) (1984).
74. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 8, 381 S.E.2d at 839.
75. Id. at 12-13, 381 S.E.2d at 841-42 (Cozort, 3., dissenting).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1 (1984).
77. Other courts also have addressed this issue. See Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Du-
buque v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1975) ("[Ajbsent consent to... adoption of [an illegiti-
mate] child .... [a known putative] father must be accorded meaningful opportunity to show he has
significantly provided for the wants of his child and is ready, willing and able to thus provide for
future wants of said child before a court can effectively terminate his parental rights.").
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It is not difficult to determine In re Adoption of Clark's relationship to In re
Clark. In re Adoption of Clark renders the court's earlier holding in In re Clark
meaningless.78 The majority held in In re Adoption of Clark that the putative
father's consent to the adoption was not required because the adoptive parents
filed the adoption petition before the putative father initiated legitimation pro-
ceedings.7 9 This conclusion ignores the fact that the father could not legitimate
the child because he had no knowledge of the child due to the adoption agency's
lack of diligence,80 a lack of diligence which the court found to be willful and
negligent in its earlier In re Clark opinion.8' There does not seem to be much
point in requiring due diligence before a termination order may be entered if an
agency can avoid such a requirement by simply filing an adoption petition.
Adoption agencies can now terminate the putative father's rights through the
adoption process and the lack of a termination order is irrelevant.82
Another problem with the court's decision in In re Adoption of Clark is that
it encourages dishonesty, or at least the withholding of information, on the part
of adoption agencies.83 The putative father loses all parental rights if he fails to
initiate legitimation proceedings before the adoption petition is filed, and it
makes no difference that this failure is a result of the dishonest practices of an
adoption agency that could have located him if it had made a realistic effort to
do so. In this case there were only two listings under the name "Lampe" in the
Winston-Salem telephone directory, and Family Services only called one of-these
numbers in its "search" for Christian Lampe.84 If it had dialed the other
number it almost certainly would have found Mr. Lampe, and he would have
had more than adequate notice of the proceedings to terminate his parental
rights.85 Because of Family Services' failure to dial this other number, Mr.
Lampe did not learn of the existence of his child until after the adoption petition
had already been ffled.86 In re Adoption of Clark now officially encourages such
questionable tactics on the part of adoption agencies. If the court had refused to
78. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 13, 381 S.E.2d at 842 (Cozort, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 9, 381 S.E.2d at 840.
80. Id. at 13, 381 S.E.2d at 842 (Cozort, J., dissenting).
81. In re Clark, 76 N.C. App. 83, 87-88, 332 S.E.2d 196, 199-200 (1985).
82. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 7, 381 S.E.2d at 838 ("While termination of a
putative father's rights may precede an adoption petition, prior termination of his rights under
Chapter 7A is not necessary if, under the applicable provisions of Chapter 48, his consent to the
adoption is not necessary."). This stance on the termination of parental rights and the adoption
process appears to put North Carolina law in conflict with the law of several other states. See In re
Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 469 (Tenn. 1980), ("There can be no valid adoption without a valid termina-
tion of parental rights.") cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Servs. of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 3, 207 N.W.2d 826, 829 (1973) ("[lit is not
possible to give custody based upon adoption without a termination of parental rights.").
83. Appellee's Brief at 11, In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 381 S.E.2d 835 (1989) (No.
8821SC916) (finding in favor of appellants "would open the door for adoption agencies to fraudu-
lently or questionably obtain infants for adoption without following the proper statutory
requirements").
84. In re Clark, 76 N.C. App. 83, 87, 332 S.E.2d 196, 199 (1985).
85. Id.
86. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 3, 381 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1989).
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uphold the adoption order it would have chilled the use of such practices.8 7 The
court would have sent a clear message to adoption agencies that such practices
are intolerable. s As a result, adoption agencies probably would be much more
conscientious in their future searches for putative fathers. As the law now
stands, there is no such incentive to locate putative fathers.
This lack of incentive to notify unwed fathers of the existence of their chil-
dren gives rise to another problem with the court's decision: its diminishment of
fathers' rights.8 9 By refusing to consider the circumstances surrounding
Lampe's failure to legitimate his child, the court effectively minimized putative
fathers' rights. This minimization of fathers' rights, however, may be in accord
with United States Supreme Court precedent. The Court applied a "substantial
relationship/significant responsibility" standard in determining the father's
rights in Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr.90 In those cases the Court conditioned the
father's rights on the degree of responsibility that the father had accepted for the
child. 9 1 The Lehr court went so far as to use custody as a measuring stick for
the determination of parental rights. Under its analysis, states may allow only
minimal legal rights to fathers who have not established custodial relationships
with their children, but must accord greater rights to fathers who have estab-
lished such relationships. 92 A significant relationship analysis would afford Mr.
Lampe only minimal parental rights because he never established any kind of
relationship with his child.
Application of this standard to the Clark case is problematic because Mr.
Lampe never had the opportunity to establish any kind of relationship with his
child, much less a significant one.93 "Without an opportunity to manifest love
and responsbility for the infant, the unwed father is effectively precluded from
87. Appellee's Brief at 11-12, In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 381 S.E.2d 835 (1989)
(No. 8821SC916).
88. Id. ("[A] holding for the respondent will further public interest in that it will show adop-
tion agencies the court's intolerance for questionable adoption practices.").
89. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 13, 381 S.E.2d 835, 842 (1989) (Cozort, J.,
dissenting).
90. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (father failed to establish a "substantial rela-
tionship" with his daughter); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (father had established
"substantial relationship" with children); and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (father
had never shouldered any "significant responsibility" with respect to the care of his child).
91. See supra notes 34-53 and accompanying text.
92. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68 ("If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the
child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.").
93. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986) (termination of
putative father's parental rights by operation of statute when he failed to file notice of paternity prior
to filing of adoption petition deprived him of due process rights when he had made known to mother
his desire to keep child, he was not a Utah resident, mother had agreed to move to Arizona with him
prior to child's birth, child was premature, and father was unaware of birth until three days later and
one day after petition for adoption was filed); Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980) ("[W]hen it is impossible for the father to file
the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his own ,] ... due
process requires that he be permitted to show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
comply with the statute."); In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461, 468-69 (Tenn. 1980) (where unwed father
went to great lengths to locate mother and his child in order to establish paternity and parent-child
relationship, to prevent child's adoption, and to regain custody following such adoption, any lack of
relationship between father and his child was not through fault of father, and father met tests of de
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being able to fulfill the Supreme Court's standards under which he could receive
parental rights in custody and adoption proceedings concerning his child." 94
When a putative father has the opportunity to establish a relationship with his
child and fails to do so, as in Quilloin v. Walcott9 and Lehr v. Robertson,9 6 then
there is no problem with according him only minimal parental rights.97 The
putative father, however, should have a chance to prove his worthiness as a
parent before the permanent termination of his relationship with his child
occurs.
9 8
The Clark court, however, refused to give the father such an opportunity.
Its goal was protecting the interests of the child, with little concern for the inter-
ests of the father. 99 Although there is nothing wrong with making the interests
of the child paramount, indeed the General Assembly has mandated this prior-
ity, there must be other ways of protecting the 6hild's interests that do not flaunt
the father's interests in the process. In its analysis the court assumed that the
child's best interests and the putative father's best interests necessarily con-
flict. 100 This assumption is not necessarily correct. It may very well be in
Daniel Clark's best interests to be in the custody of his natural father rather than
in the custody of his adoptive parents.' 01 This issue will never be resolved, how-
ever, because the court automatically assumed that the child was better off with
the adoptive parents without much attention to the benefits of the natural father
having custody.10 2 Courts overseeing adoptions should have to examine the in-
terests of the putative father and child on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether a conflict exists before purporting to act in the child's best interests.
Another way of protecting the child's interests, without diminishing the
father's interests, is simply to require that adoption agencies make more strin-
gent efforts to locate the putative father when the identity of that father is
known.10 3 All that need be required is that adoption agencies follow the court's
facto fatherhood; therefore, father was entitled to minimal due process of law before child could be
adopted), cert. denied, Riggs v. Terrazus, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
94. Note, Notice of Relinquishment, supra note 33 at 389. See also Note, The Putative Father's
Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1081, 1087
(1986) ("[W]bat if the father is afforded no opportunity to develop an ongoing relationship with his
child?").
95. 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978) (father provided support on irregular basis, child was eleven years
old, child expressed desire to be adopted).
96. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (father knew of child's existence and did not seek to establish any
legal ties until after child was two years old).
97. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Utah 1984) (father knew of
mother's pregnancy, knew of potential adoption, did not protest mother's decision to place child for
adoption).
98. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
99. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 13, 381 S.E.2d 835, 842 (1989) (Cozort, J.,
dissenting).
100. Id. at 8-9, 381 S.E.2d at 839-40.
101. See In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal.3d 65, 75, 688 P.2d 918, 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316 (1984)
(natural father's parental rights could not be terminated by considering only the best interests of the
child without first considering whether an award of custody to the father would be detrimental to the
child).
102. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. at 8, 381 S.E.2d at 839 (child's welfare should not be
dependent on father's knowledge of its existence).
103. In re Clark, 76 N.C. App. 83, 86-87, 332 S.E.2d 196, 199-200 (1985).
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holding in In re Clark and exercise due diligence ° 4 in attempting to locate the
putative father. Such a requirement is a workable alternative to the In re Adop-
tion of Clark result. If the agency makes a diligent effort to locate the putative
father and is genuinely unable to do so, it then may proceed with the adoption.
The adoption process would thus not jeoparize the child's welfare and, at the
same time, not diminish the father's rights.
If the adoption agency makes this effort and is unable to locate the father or
the father takes no action to legitimate the child if he is located, then the adop-
tive parents should be able to complete the adoption without the father's con-
sent. The child's adoption should not be slowed by a disinterested father or by a
father who genuinely cannot be located. The interested father who can be lo-
cated, however, would be given the opportunity to develop a relationship with
his child and would not have his parental rights taken away as a result of the
negligent or dishonest practices of an adoption agency.105
One final solution to the problems created by the In re Adoption of Clark
decision and a way to protect the rights of both the putative father and his child
is to require a termination of the father's parental rights before an adoption peti-
tion may be filed. Such a rule would protect the father because it would force
adoption agencies to follow the requirement established by the court's decision
in In re Clark: adoption agencies must exercise due diligence in attempting to
locate the putative father. 10 6 Fathers like Christian Lampe who would have
been located if any genuine effort had been made to find them would then have a
chance to exercise their parental rights. Conversely, such a requirement would
not harm the child. If the adoption agency is genuinely unable to locate the
father, his parental rights can be terminated under the North Carolina statute10 7
and the child's adoption then can proceed. Not only would the child's interests
be unharmed, they would be protected: the child would have the opportunity to
establish ties with its natural father. 108
KELLY ANNE DAVIS
104. "Due diligence" is "[s]uch a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be
expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular
circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the
special case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (5th ed. 1979).
105. See supra note 88.
106. In re Clark, 76 N.C. App. at 87-88, 332 S.E.2d at 199.
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(6) (1989).
108. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
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